26 October 2026
Since 2023, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly used Parliament, the media and other public platforms to describe sovereign access to the Red Sea as an existential national objective. Although Ethiopian officials maintain that they favour negotiation, the sustained campaign for sovereign maritime access, and its repeated focus on Eritrean ports, has raised serious concerns about Eritrea’s sovereignty and regional peace.
Colonial boundaries and Eritrean sovereignty
Under international law, the status of Assab as part of Eritrea is settled. Following a United Nations-supervised referendum, Eritrea became an independent state in 1993 within the borders of the former Italian colony of Eritrea. Ethiopia formally recognised Eritrea’s sovereignty and independence, and Eritrea was subsequently admitted to both the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.
This territorial framework is supported by the principle of uti possidetis juris, under which newly independent African states retained the borders that existed at independence. The OAU endorsed this principle in its 1964 Cairo Resolution to protect territorial stability and prevent continuing border conflicts.
The Algiers Agreement and the Boundary Commission
Following the devastating 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border war, the two countries signed the Algiers Agreement on 12 December 2000. The agreement established the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission and authorised it to delimit and demarcate the border on the basis of the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908 and applicable international law.
The Commission delivered its unanimous delimitation decision in April 2002. Under the Algiers Agreement, that decision was “final and binding” on both countries.
It is important to describe the decision accurately: the Commission did not conduct a separate legal determination of ownership of Assab, because Assab was not a disputed territory submitted to it. Assab was already internationally recognised as part of Eritrea. The Commission instead determined the disputed land boundary between the two states, including its eastern sector.
Consequently, Ethiopia possesses no internationally recognised sovereign claim to Assab. Commercial access to an Eritrean port could be negotiated, but access does not confer sovereignty or ownership.
Ethiopia’s historical and economic arguments
Supporters of Ethiopia’s claim commonly advance several arguments:
- Historical connections: They refer to ancient political and commercial links between the Ethiopian highlands and the Red Sea, including the maritime connections of the Kingdom of Aksum.
- Federation and previous use of Assab: Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and later annexed by Ethiopia. Until Eritrean independence, Assab operated as an important Ethiopian maritime gateway. Previous use of a port, however, does not create a present-day right of sovereignty over territory belonging to another state.
- Economic necessity: Landlocked Ethiopia depends heavily on Djibouti for its international trade. Prime Minister Abiy has described direct and reliable maritime access as essential to Ethiopia’s economic and national future. Economic necessity may justify negotiations for port services, but it does not establish a legal right to acquire another state’s coastline.
- Objections to Eritrea’s separation: Some Ethiopian commentators argue that the transitional government’s recognition of Eritrean independence between 1991 and 1993 lacked sufficient constitutional or parliamentary approval. Others question the application of uti possidetis juris because Ethiopia was not colonised.
These domestic constitutional arguments do not alter Eritrea’s established international status. Ethiopia formally recognised Eritrean independence after the UN-supervised referendum in 1993. Eritrea was admitted to the United Nations and the OAU, and both countries subsequently reaffirmed the borders existing at independence through the Algiers Agreement.
Ethiopia’s own colonial history is not decisive. The relevant boundary separated Ethiopia from the former Italian colony of Eritrea and was defined through treaties concluded in 1900, 1902 and 1908. Both governments later expressly authorised the Boundary Commission to apply those treaties and the principle of respect for borders existing at independence.
ial history is not decisive. The relevant boundary separated Ethiopia from the former Italian colony of Eritrea and was defined through treaties concluded in 1900, 1902 and 1908. Both governments later expressly authorised the Boundary Commission to apply those treaties and the principle of respect for borders existing at independence.
Negotiated access is not territorial ownership
International law distinguishes between access to a port and sovereignty over the territory in which that port is located. Many landlocked countries conduct international trade through neighbouring states under negotiated transit, customs, railway and port agreements. Such arrangements do not transfer ownership or sovereignty.
Ethiopia may legitimately seek dependable and economically sustainable access to maritime services. It may negotiate with Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia or other coastal neighbours. However, any arrangement must be freely accepted by the coastal state and must respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Historical association, population size and economic need do not create a legal entitlement to another country’s territory.
Escalating tensions in 2026
Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea deteriorated sharply in 2026. On 1 October, Ethiopia ordered the closure of its embassy in Asmara and expelled ten Eritrean diplomats. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic relations. Both governments have since exchanged serious accusations concerning military incursions, support for armed groups and preparations for aggression.
There have also been reports of Eritrean troops entering towns in northern Ethiopia, although aspects of these reports and the competing claims of the two governments remain contested. The escalation has prompted concern from the African Union and has been discussed during closed consultations of the United Nations Security Council.
These developments make precise language especially important. Unverified allegations should not be presented as established facts, and statements attributed to political or military leaders should be supported by recordings, transcripts or reliable reporting.
The credibility of the African Union’s headquarters
The location of the African Union’s headquarters does not determine Ethiopia’s legal obligations, but it raises an important question of institutional credibility. As the host of the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia has a particular responsibility to uphold the principles on which the continental organisation is founded.
The 1964 OAU Cairo Resolution requires African states to respect the borders that existed when they attained independence. Articles 4(b) and 4(f) of the AU Constitutive Act likewise require respect for borders existing at independence and prohibit the threat or use of force among member states.
If Ethiopia were officially to reject Eritrea’s internationally recognised boundaries, threaten force or attempt to acquire Assab without Eritrea’s freely given consent, it would be acting contrary to these foundational principles. Such conduct by the country hosting the AU headquarters would seriously undermine the organisation’s authority and credibility.
The AU and its member states would then have a responsibility to examine Ethiopia’s compliance with its obligations, consider appropriate measures under the Constitutive Act and assess whether Addis Ababa remained a suitable location for the Union’s headquarters. Relocation would not occur automatically: Article 24 expressly establishes Addis Ababa as the headquarters, so moving it would require a collective legal and political decision by AU member states.
A state cannot credibly host Africa’s principal continental institution while threatening the sovereignty and internationally recognised borders that the same institution was created to protect.
Conclusion
The legal position is clear: Eritrea is a sovereign state within its internationally recognised borders, and Assab forms part of Eritrean territory. Ethiopia has a legitimate interest in negotiating reliable commercial access to the sea, but it has no recognised sovereign claim to Assab.
Any threat or use of force to alter an international boundary would violate the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Maritime access must therefore be pursued through peaceful negotiation, mutual agreement and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring states.
Human Rights Concern – Eritrea (HRCE)
Sources and further reading
- Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission — Permanent Court of Arbitration
- Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia — Algiers Agreement, 2000
- 1964 OAU Cairo Resolution on African borders — AHG/Res.16(I)
- Admission of Eritrea to the United Nations — General Assembly Resolution 47/230
- Constitutive Act of the African Union — Articles 4, 23 and 24
- Ethiopia–Eritrea diplomatic rupture, October 2026 — Associated Press
- Review of Abiy Ahmed’s 2023 parliamentary remarks — AFP Fact Check
